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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015 and 2016, hackers affiliated with the Russian government broke 
into servers of the U.S. Democratic National Committee (DNC).1 The subse-
quent release of documents hurt Democrats in Congressional races, led to the 
resignation of the DNC Chairperson, created tension between the Clinton and 
Sanders camps, and, above all, figured prominently in the race for president.2 
The Russian operations were yet another example of Russia’s proficiency at ex-
ploiting the “grey zones” of international law, which it had honed during opera-
tions that led to the belligerent occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and its sup-
port for insurgent forces in eastern Ukraine. 
By this strategy, Russia exploits international law principles and rules that 
are poorly demarcated or are subject to competing interpretations. With respect 
to its activities in Ukraine, Russia played on the legal margins by masking its 
direct involvement in the hostilities, which would have implicated the jus ad bel-
lum use of force prohibition3 and openly initiated an international armed conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine under the jus in bello.4 In doing so, Russia refocused 
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 1. Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, 
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE 2 (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.intelligence.sen-
ate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
 2. Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyber-
power Invaded the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/poli-
tics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html?_r=0. 
 3. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). On the customary international law character of the prohibition, see 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S) (Nicaragua), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 188-90 (June 27).  
 4. Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions sets forth the accepted standard for an 
international armed conflict. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies 
in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 1 Bevans 7; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
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attention on the complex questions of State responsibility for the actions of non-
State actors5 and the level of control under international humanitarian law that 
internationalizes a non-international armed conflict.6 
The DNC hacks epitomized the grey zone strategy. The legal issue posed 
was whether the operations amounted to either a breach of U.S. sovereignty or a 
prohibited intervention under international law, topics addressed below.7 As to 
the former, some current and former highly-placed U.S. government officials 
have recently questioned whether sovereignty is a primary rule of international 
law—that is, a rule that can itself be breached.8 With respect to the latter, the 
operations had to be intended to “coerce” the United States before qualifying as 
prohibited intervention.9 It is unclear whether facilitating the release of actual e-
mails—as distinct from, for example, using cyber means to alter election re-
turns—amounts to coercion as a matter of law. Such normative uncertainty pro-
vided fertile ground upon which the Russians could conduct their operations. 
By acting within legal grey zones, Russia makes it difficult for other States 
to definitively name and shame the country as having committed an internation-
ally wrongful act.10 Legal ambiguity also hobbles responses. Had the DNC hacks 
plainly been unlawful under international law, the United States would have been 
entitled to take “countermeasures,” actions that are unlawful but for the fact that 
they respond to another State’s unlawful action. In this case, the Obama admin-
istration could have employed countermeasures, like hack backs, to disrupt Rus-
sian government and private cyber activities. Instead, the U.S. government re-
sorted to the expulsion of 35 diplomats and the imposition of limited sanctions.11 
 
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Conven-
tion (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 5. See G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 8, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility] (“The conduct of a person or group of 
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is 
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”). 
 6. This requisite level of control is generally understood to be “overall control” of an organized 
armed group. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 131-140, 145, 
162 (Intl’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Chamber 
Judgment]. On internationalization of conflict, see Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Rel-
evant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 56-63 (Eliz-
abeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). 
 7. Espionage per se is not a violation of international law. However, the method by which it is 
accomplished may be unlawful, as when it violates the target State’s sovereignty. See INT’L GROUP OF 
EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 168 
-74 (Rule 32) (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
 8. Gary P. Corn, Jennifer M. O’Connor & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 
AJIL UNBOUND (forthcoming). For the contrary position, see Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect 
for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 9. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107-08, ¶ 205. 
 10. The elements of an internationally wrongful act are attribution and breach of an international 
legal obligation. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, annex, art. 2. 
 11. As to the possibility that covert countermeasures might have been employed, note that there 
is a requirement of prior notice, since the purpose of countermeasures is to compel the State engaging in 
the unlawful conduct to desist. In situations where such notice is not feasible because of the necessity of 
an immediate response, or notice would allow that State to effectively defend against the countermeasures, 
post factum notice would still be required to convey the message that the State’s unlawful conduct comes 
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In a sense, Russia’s grey zone operations amount to a form of “asymmet-
rical lawfare.” Its strategy is asymmetrical in the sense that States committed to 
the rule of law are less likely to operate in the grey zone than States that do not 
share this rule of law commitment. Thus, Russia has all the more reason to en-
gage in legally ambiguous operations; it knows that its opponents may hesitate 
to react decisively, out of concern that their own response might be characterized 
as unlawful, opening the door to Russian claims of being the victim.12 Com-
pounding the situation is the fact that a target State’s failure to respond at a com-
mensurate level of severity—as in the weak U.S. response to Russian hacking—
makes the attacker appear more powerful. In this asymmetrical dynamic, the 
State exploiting the grey zone accordingly tends to enjoy the advantage. 
Fueling asymmetry is the fact that liberal democracies represent especially 
lucrative grey zone targets. As former President Tomas Ilves of Estonia percep-
tively noted, “Liberal democracies with a free press and free and fair elections 
are at an asymmetric disadvantage because they can be interfered with—the tools 
of their democratic and free speech can be used against them.”13 Such interfer-
ences often take place in the grey zones of international law. 
This Essay identifies certain critical grey zones of international law that are 
susceptible to exploitation when conducting cyber operations. In doing so, it 
draws on the work of the two international groups of experts who prepared the 
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare and Tal-
linn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, pub-
lished in 2013 and 2017, respectively.14 The latter, which incorporates a slightly 
revised version of the former,15 is the culmination of a seven-year project spon-
sored by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence that ex-
amined how international law applies in cyberspace. Tallinn Manual 2.0 identi-
fies scores of issues on which the expert opinions of the team diverged or there 
was lack of universal consensus. These disagreements demarcate much of the 
grey zones’ landscape. Section II of the Essay highlights key grey zones that are 
particularly ripe for exploitation and in need of clarification by States. The cata-
logue is by no means exhaustive. States wishing to operate in the grey zones will 
seize opportunity wherever it presents itself. Finally, Section III concludes the 
 
at a cost. Therefore, covert countermeasures are more in the nature of retaliation, which is not a lawful 
purpose of countermeasures. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 8, at 116 (Rule 21); see also id. at 
120 cmts. 10-12 (discussing the requirement of notification for countermeasures). 
 12. As noted by a U.S. intelligence officer, “It’s not that the Russians are doing something others 
can’t do . . . It’s that Russian hackers are willing to go there, to experiment and carry out attacks that other 
countries would back away from.” Sheera Frenkel, The New Handbook for Cyberwar is Being Written by 
Russia, BUZZFEED (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/the-new-handbook-for-
cyberwar-is-being-written-by-russia?utm_term=.jgOpW30jD#.kb0G6B2dL. 
 13. Id. 
 14. INT’L GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 1.0]; TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7. 
 15. In this Essay, references to the “views of the experts” refer to the group of experts that 
handled the matter. The first group (Tallinn Manual 1.0) addressed the use of force and humanitarian law 
issues raised in this Essay, whereas the second (Tallinn Manual 2.0) dealt with the other matters. Because 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 incorporates the slightly revised text of the first manual, references herein are to the 
latter publication. 
4 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42: 2 
 
Essay by proffering an approach that would narrow the grey zones so as to en-
hance normative stability in cyberspace. It also offers final thoughts on the ben-
efits of such narrowing. 
I. KEY GREY ZONES 
A. Sovereignty 
Of all international law principles, sovereignty is perhaps the most funda-
mental. From that principal emerges, inter alia, notions of non-intervention; pre-
scriptive, enforcement, and adjudicative jurisdiction; sovereign immunity; due 
diligence; and territorial integrity. Max Huber set forth the classic definition of 
sovereignty in his 1928 Island of Palmas arbitral award: “Sovereignty in the re-
lations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a por-
tion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other 
State, the functions of a State.”16 
Sovereignty has both an internal and external component. Internal sover-
eignty refers to the right of a State to exercise its control over persons, including 
legal persons, objects, and activities on its territory. It is incontrovertible that this 
right extends to control over individuals engaged in cyber activities, cyber infra-
structure located on a State’s territory, and any cyber activities that occur in or 
through that territory.17 For instance, a State is entitled to exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction to promulgate legislation and regulations governing cyber operations 
emanating from its territory.18 This authority extends to both public and private 
persons and cyber infrastructure19 and applies irrespective of the nationality of 
the natural or legal persons involved.20 It is, however, subject to specific carve 
outs in international law, such as the protections of international human rights 
law.21 
External sovereignty, by contrast, refers to the right of States to engage in 
international relations, as in the case of conducting diplomacy and entering into 
international agreements.22 For example, in the exercise of external sovereignty 
a State is free to, or not to, become Party to a treaty governing cyber activities. 
Such sovereignty is also the basis for the legal immunity of States.23 As with 
internal sovereignty, the existence of external sovereignty is not in dispute. 
There are, however, two significant grey zones with respect to sovereignty. 
The first is a novel contention that has only recently emerged. Its proponents 
argue that sovereignty is but a foundational principle that yields no sovereignty-
specific primary rule of international law. Interestingly, that approach failed to 
 
 16. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 17. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 13-16 (Rule 2) cmts. 1-12. The term “cyber 
infrastructure” as used in this Essay refers to “[t]he communications, storage, and computing devices upon 
which information systems are built and operate.” Id. at 564. 
 18. Id. at 55 (Rule 9) cmt. 1. 
 19. Id. at 13-14 (Rule 2) cmt. 3. 
 20. Id. at 14 (Rule 2) cmt. 7. 
 21. See id. at 179-208 (Rules 34-38). 
 22. Id. at 16-17 (Rule 3). 
 23. Id. at 71-74 (Rule 12). 
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surface during the seven years of deliberations among the Tallinn Manuals ex-
perts. Nor did it play any role in the unofficial consultations with over 50 States 
and international organizations prior to publication of Tallinn Manual 2.0. How-
ever, writing in their personal capacity, three senior U.S. Department of Defense 
officials, two of whom have since left government, have argued that there is no 
prohibition on the violation of another State’s sovereignty as such.24 Instead, the 
activities of a State conducting cyber operations are only susceptible to violating 
other primary rules of international law, like non-intervention or the prohibition 
on the use of force. This position may mirror the one taken in a Department of 
Defense (DoD) legal memorandum that was released but then, after drawing at-
tention, quickly designated “internal distribution only” by the then-General 
Counsel of the Department, Jennifer O’Connor, on the day before the inaugura-
tion of President Trump. This presumption that the positions overlapped is based 
on the fact that O’Connor is one of the three authors of the aforementioned piece. 
Additionally, the other two were the current Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Cyber 
Command and the former DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel. 
This “sovereignty as principal, but not rule” approach contradicts extensive 
State practice and opinio juris in the non-cyber context, which treat the prohibi-
tion as a primary rule, such that a violation of sovereignty would constitute an 
internationally wrongful act.25 Moreover, there is no evidence that it represents 
the official position of the United States. Indeed, it would be surprising if it 
achieved that status since such a position would dismantle a key normative fire-
wall safeguarding U.S. cyber infrastructure and activities. Nevertheless, consid-
ering the seniority of its proponents, the view has the potential to create a, hope-
fully temporary, grey zone within which other States could operate. For instance, 
the uncertainty created by this embryonic approach weakens arguments that 
North Korea’s Sony hacks26 or Russia’s targeting of the DNC violated U.S. sov-
ereignty. 
The better, and prevailing, view is that sovereignty is the basis for a pri-
mary rule of international law by which the cyber operations of one State can 
violate the sovereignty of another. As noted by the International Court of Justice 
in its first case, Corfu Channel, “Between independent States, respect for territo-
rial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”27 Central to 
this principle is the inviolability of territory, which protects against non-consen-
sual actions on one State’s territory by, or attributable to, another. The paradig-
matic illustration in the cyber context is a close access operation involving the 
uploading of malware to cyber infrastructure using a USB flash drive.28 There is 
 
 24. Corn, O’Connor & Taylor, supra note 8. 
 25. See Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 8. 
 26. Michael Schmitt, International Law and Cyber Attacks: Sony v. North Korea, JUST 
SECURITY (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/18460/international-humanitarian-law-cyber-at-
tacks-sony-v-north-korea/. 
 27. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9). 
 28. A possible exception is non-destructive cyber espionage while on another State’s territory. 
A majority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts were of the view that conducting cyber espionage while 
physically present on another State’s territory violates that State’s sovereignty. However, some of the 
experts opined that the widespread practice of conducting espionage while abroad, although a violation of 
the target State’s domestic law, creates a “carve out” in the law of sovereignty and therefore does not, in 
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also general agreement that a State may not conduct “inherently governmental 
functions exclusively reserved to another State on the latter’s territory,”29 such 
as engaging in law enforcement without consent.30 This prohibition would bar, 
for instance, a law enforcement officer of one State from conducting a search of 
databases through cyber means while in another State’s territory.31 
Despite this consensus, a substantial grey zone exists with respect to remote 
cyber operations conducted from outside the target State. The controversy does 
not involve remote operations that interfere with, or usurp, inherently govern-
mental functions, because the target State undeniably enjoys an exclusive right 
to perform them on its territory.32 A remote cyber operation causing physical 
damage or injury on another State’s territory violates the latter’s sovereignty, 
since the well-accepted notion of territorial integrity and inviolability is at its 
zenith when physical consequences manifest.33 For instance, a cyber operation 
conducted by, or attributable to, a State that causes private infrastructure based 
in another State’s territory to overheat, thereby damaging it, is a clear violation 
of sovereignty. 
Below this threshold, a grey zone looms due to the lack of State practice 
and opinio juris. Some of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts were of the view that 
the threshold for a violation of sovereignty should be drawn at physical damage 
or injury. However, a majority of them concluded that remotely causing cyber 
infrastructure’s non-temporary loss of functionality is likewise a sovereignty vi-
olation, even if no physical damage occurs.34 They correctly understood that 
there is little practical difference between physically damaging property and ren-
dering it virtually inoperable. 
Others took an even broader view but were unable to achieve any mean-
ingful consensus as to precise criteria for a violation. Among the many possibil-
ities tendered were “a cyber operation causing cyber infrastructure or programs 
to operate differently; altering or deleting data stored in cyber infrastructure with-
out causing physical or functional consequences . . . .; emplacing malware into a 
system; installing backdoors; and causing a temporary, but significant, loss of 
functionality, as in the case of a major DDoS operation.”35 Resolution of this 
quandary through State practice and opinio juris is likely to take time; until then, 
hostile non-injurious or non-destructive cyber operations conducted into other 
 
and of itself, amount to a sovereignty violation. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 19 (Rule 4) cmts. 
7-8. 
 29. Id. at 22-23 (Rule 4) cmt. 18. 
 30. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 138, Question Relating to the Case of Adolf Eichmann (June 23, 1960). 
The resolution, adopted in the aftermath of the 1960 abduction of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann 
from Argentina, declared that such acts affect sovereignty. Id. ¶ 1. 
 31. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 22-23 (Rule 4) cmts. 16-18. A small grey zone exists 
with respect to the somewhat ambiguous term “inherently governmental functions,” but certain situations 
are clear. Among those cited by the Tallinn Manual experts were “changing or deleting data such that it 
interferes with the delivery of social services, the conduct of elections, the collection of taxes, the effective 
conduct of diplomacy, and the performance of key national events activities.” Id. at 22 (Rule 4) cmt. 16. 
 32. Id. at 21-22 (Rule 4) cmt. 15. 
 33. Id. at 20 (Rule 4) cmt. 11. A few of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts opined that physical 
damage or injury is but one factor in assessing whether a violation of sovereignty has occurred. Id. cmt. 
12. 
 34. Id. at 20-21 (Rule 4) cmt. 13. 
 35. Id. at 21 (Rule 4) cmt. 14. 
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States’ territory will benefit from the uncertainties surrounding the legal concept 
of a sovereignty violation. 
B. Intervention 
Intervention into the internal or external affairs of other States is an inter-
nationally wrongful act.36 The rule of non-intervention is a natural derivative of 
the concept of sovereignty; to the extent that a State enjoys exclusive sovereign 
rights, other States necessarily shoulder a duty to respect them.37 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice confirmed the prohibition in its Nicaragua judgement, 
where it observed, “The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every 
sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though exam-
ples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that 
it is part and parcel of customary international law.”38 
There are two conditions precedent to finding a violation of the prohibition. 
Both are replete with vagueness that results in a wide grey zone. First, the prohi-
bition only applies to matters that fall within another State’s domaine réservé. As 
noted in Nicaragua, “[a] prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing 
on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, 
to decide freely.”39 These are matters that international law leaves to the sole 
discretion of the State concerned, such as the “choice of a political, economic, 
social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”40 To illustrate, 
elections fall within the domaine réservé, such that using cyber means to frustrate 
them would raise issues of intervention. By contrast, purely commercial activi-
ties typically do not. Therefore, a State’s cyber operations that are intended to 
afford business advantages to its national companies would not amount to inter-
vention. Between these extremes, the scope of domaine réservé is indistinct. For 
instance, States generally enjoy an exclusive right to regulate online communi-
cation in the exercise of its sovereignty. Yet, the point at which international 
human rights law, such as the rights to freedom of expression or privacy,41 takes 
domestic regulation beyond the confines of the domaine réservé remains unset-
tled. 
 
 36. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 205; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 312 (Rule 66). 
 37. The prohibition of intervention “is the corollary of every state’s right to sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and political independence.” OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 428 (Robert Jennings & 
Arthur Watts eds., 1996). 
 38. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 106-07, ¶ 202. 
 39. Id. ¶ 205. They are matters “not, in principle, regulated by international law.” Nationality 
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7). 
 40. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 205. See also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly 
Relations] (discussing “[t]he principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter”); G.A. Res. 36/103, annex, ¶ 2(b), Declaration 
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981). 
 41. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, arts. 12, 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 
10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 17, 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. 
DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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Second, to qualify as prohibited intervention, the act in question must in-
volve coercion.42 In the simplest terms, a coercive act is one designed to compel 
another State to take action it would otherwise not take, or to refrain from taking 
action it would otherwise engage in.43 Coercion is accordingly more than mere 
influence. It involves undertaking measures that deprive the target State of 
choice. 
Like domaine réservé, the precise parameters of coercion are less than de-
finitive. Obviously, threatening or employing military force qualifies as coer-
cion. In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice found that “[t]he element 
of coercion . . . is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses 
force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support 
for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.”44 In that case, 
the funding of insurgent forces was found to constitute prohibited intervention.45 
Analogously, funding a hacker group that engages in destructive cyber opera-
tions could qualify as intervention. At the other extreme, diplomacy and propa-
ganda, albeit intended to cause another State to act in a certain manner, do not 
qualify as intervention because the target State retains the ability to choose; the 
decisions they are meant to affect remain voluntary, even though they may now 
be suboptimal. 
The Russian hacks of the DNC servers offer a contemporary example of 
the grey zone surrounding coercion. Opinions vary as to whether the cyber oper-
ations were coercive in the intervention sense. The emails that were released had 
not been altered, and it is generally accepted that mere espionage, without more, 
is not unlawful under international law.46 The opposing, and slightly sounder, 
view is that the cyber operations manipulated the process of elections and there-
fore caused them to unfold in a way that they otherwise would not have. In this 
sense, they were coercive. This grey zone surrounding coercion may have been 
the reason that the United States neither labelled the operations as unlawful nor 
took “countermeasures.”47 Of course, it is unknown what drove the U.S. re-
sponse; perhaps it was a belief that the Russian actions were lawful, an uncer-
tainty as to the state of the law, or even a U.S. desire to retain grey zone opera-
tions in its own kit bag. 
C. Attribution 
Under international law, States bear responsibility for the internationally 
wrongful cyber activities of their organs, such as the armed forces, intelligence 
services, and law enforcement agencies.48 They are also legally responsible for 
 
 42. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 205. 
 43. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 318-19 (Rule 66) cmt. 21. 
 44. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 205. 
 45. Id. ¶ 228. 
 46. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 168-74 (Rule 32). 
 47. The author’s views on countermeasures are set forth in “Below the Threshold” Cyber Op-
erations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697 (2014). 
 48. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, annex, art. 4. 
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the acts of persons or entities that have been empowered by domestic law to “ex-
ercise elements of the governmental authority.”49 As an example, a State that 
contracts with a private company to engage in law enforcement activities by 
cyber means on another State’s territory without that State’s consent is itself re-
sponsible for any violation of the latter’s sovereignty by the company. In both 
cases, the State is responsible, even if the acts in question are ultra vires.50 
The grey zone with respect to attribution under the law of State responsi-
bility tends to involve cyber operations that are conducted by non-State actors 
but are in some way linked to a State. For instance, consider the 2013 and 2014 
Yahoo hacks that compromised over a billion accounts. The company asserted 
that the operations were “state-sponsored.”51 In terms of legal—as distinct from 
factual—attribution, the nonbinding yet authoritative International Law Com-
mission’s Articles on State Responsibility provide that “[t]he conduct of a person 
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law 
if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”52 Unfortu-
nately, the notions of “instructions,” “direction,” and “control” all lack clarity. 
The easiest concept to deal with is instructions. According to the commen-
tary to the Articles on State Responsibility, instruction involves a non-State actor 
functioning as an auxiliary of the State.53 Typically, the situation comprises the 
issuance of commands by the State to the non-State actor, such as a hacker group, 
to conduct a specific cyber operation. The activities concerned need not involve 
“elements of the governmental authority.” 
More problematic are the concepts of direction and control. The commen-
tary suggests that the two should be viewed disjunctively,54 but it does not elu-
cidate the difference between them. Similarly, international tribunals have failed 
to distinguish instructions, directions, and control with any degree of granularity. 
Instead, the prevailing approach tends towards a binary distinction in which ei-
ther a State tells a non-State actor to perform an act (instruction or direction) or 
the State exercises “effective control” over the non-State actor with respect to 
the act in question. 
The effective control test was first articulated by the International Court of 
Justice in its Nicaragua judgment55 but was developed more fully by the court in 
the Bosnian Genocide case.56 Speaking to the issue of attribution, the court 
noted: 
 
 49. Id. annex, art. 5. 
 50. Id. annex, art. 7. 
 51. Sam Thielman, Yahoo Hack: 1bn Accounts Compromised by Biggest Data Breach in His-
tory, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/14/yahoo-
hack-security-of-one-billion-accounts-breached. 
 52. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, annex, art. 8. 
 53. UNITED NATIONS, MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/25 (2012), ¶ 2 of commentary to art. 8. 
 54. See id., ¶ 7 of commentary to art. 8. 
 55. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64-65, ¶ 115. 
 56. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26). 
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[I]t is not necessary to show that the persons who performed the acts alleged to have 
violated international law were in general in a relationship of “complete dependence” 
on the respondent State; it has to be proved that they acted in accordance with that 
State’s instructions or under its “effective control”. It must however be shown that 
this “effective control” was exercised, or that the State’s instructions were given, in 
respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in 
respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having com-
mitted the violations.57 
The court rejected the less stringent “overall control” test adopted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case.58 It 
opined that “the ‘overall control’ test has the major drawback of broadening the 
scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing 
the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own 
conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its 
behalf.”59 
Thus, if the degree of control does not reach the overall level, it does not 
necessarily rise to that of effective control. Since the Yugoslavia tribunal ob-
served that overall control involved more than “the mere financing and equipping 
of such forces” and should include “planning and supervision of military opera-
tions,”60 financing and providing malware to a non-state hacker or terrorist group 
that carries out hostile cyber operations against another State would not suffice 
for attribution. Nor would the threshold be crossed if the group conducts cyber 
operations merely to please the State, express support for it, or enhance or facil-
itate its cyber operations without being asked to do so, since none of these ex-
amples would involve “control.” 
The key is actual control over the cyber operations themselves. Herein lies 
the grey zone, for the law remains imprecise as to the nature and extent of the 
requisite control. It is reasonable to interpret the notion of effective control as 
denoting a State’s de facto ability to cause the non-State actor to launch, termi-
nate, or adjust the cyber operations in question. But would, for instance, a State’s 
ability to withdraw financial or material support for a non-State group provide 
the requisite degree of control if withdrawal would considerably affect the 
group’s ability to continue operating? In other words, although merely funding 
an operation may not suffice, is there a point at which the non-State group be-
comes so dependent on State support that the State essentially exercises effective 
control over whether and how the group conducts its cyber operations? Similarly, 
can providing sanctuary for a non-State group be interpreted as effective control 
over the group’s cyber activities when that group would not survive without 
sanctuary? Absent either express instructions to engage in a cyber operation or 
integration into the State’s formal or informal command structure, it will be dif-
ficult to conclusively attribute a non-State actor’s cyber operations based on a 
State’s control over it, except in the most obvious of cases. 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 400. 
 58. Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 137. 
 59. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 210, ¶ 406. 
 60. Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 145. 
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D. Due Diligence 
Pursuant to the principle of due diligence, States are obligated to ensure 
that their territory is not used for purposes detrimental to the rights of other 
States. As noted by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case, 
it is “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States.”61 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that this principle applies to cyber 
operations emanating from a State’s territory.62 For example, during the 2007 
widespread hostile cyber operations against Estonia, most of which originated 
from Russian territory, Russia breached this obligation by failing to take action 
to terminate them after it became aware of the electronic onslaught.63 However, 
because not every State involved in pre-publication consultations readily ac-
cepted the application of due diligence to cyberspace as a matter of customary 
law, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 acknowledges a view by which the premise of ap-
plicability is lex ferenda (what the law should be), rather than lex lata (current 
law).64 This position is based in part on the 2013 and 2015 reports of the United 
Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of In-
formation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 
(GGE). In the reports, the GGE stated that States “should,” rather than must, take 
those actions necessary to put an end to cyber operations harmful to other States 
emanating from the formers’ territories.65 As due diligence is purportedly a pri-
mary rule of international law, a State’s violation of which constitutes an inter-
nationally wrongful act, such hesitancy to accord the rule lex lata status produces 
a grey zone of international law. 
Contributing to that zone is the fact that the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts 
were sometimes divided as to the interpretation of the due diligence obligation. 
All agreed that it applies when cyber operations having serious adverse conse-
quences vis-à-vis a legal right of a State are mounted from another State’s terri-
tory. This standard, however, raises a number of issues that broaden the grey 
area. 
First, the term “serious adverse consequences,” which the experts bor-
rowed from international environmental law,66 is undefined in international law. 
 
 61. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22. See also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“It is well settled that a State is bound to use due 
diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its 
people.”); Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 839 (“Territorial sovereignty . . . involves the exclusive right to 
display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the 
territory the rights of other States . . . .”). 
 62. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 30 (Rule 6). 
 63. On the incident, see ENEKIN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER 
INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14-34 (2010), https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsider-
ations.pdf. 
 64. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 31 (Rule 6) cmt. 3. 
 65. Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. & Telecomm. in the 
Context of Int’l Sec., U.N. Doc. A/68/98, ¶ 23 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 GGE Report]; Rep. of 
the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. & Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Sec., 
U.N. Doc. A/70/174, ¶¶ 13(c), 28(e) (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 GGE Report]. 
 66. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941) (“[N]o State has the right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
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Moreover, seriousness is typically understood as contextual in nature, and con-
textuality generally leads to ambiguity. A few experts even argued that the stand-
ard set the threshold too high and instead proposed use of the term “significant” 
in lieu of “serious.”67 
Botnets pose unique issues vis-à-vis the due diligence obligation.68 Many 
cyber operations launched from one State against another are conducted by 
means of a botnet. The individual bots that make up the botnets may be located 
in many countries. This raises the question of whether the requirement of serious 
adverse consequences refers to the aggregate consequences caused by the botnet 
or only to those consequences caused by the bots in the State that may have the 
due diligence obligation. A minority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts, ap-
proaching the matter from the perspective of a State suffering the harm, adopted 
the former view,69 whereas the majority, addressing it from that of a State shoul-
dering the due diligence obligation, supported the latter. The majority did so on 
the basis that “the other approach would create an imbalance between the right 
to control territory and the duty to ensure it is not used to harm other States.”70 
It is the more principled approach in law. 
Second, the requirement that the consequences involve the legal right of 
another State fuels grey zone issues generally. As discussed, there is a degree of 
controversy surrounding the assertion of violation of sovereignty as a primary 
rule. If it is not a primary rule, operations that would otherwise breach it would 
not fall within the ambit of the due diligence obligation. Similarly, recall the 
uncertainty as to the element of coercion in prohibited intervention. Should the 
coercive element not be satisfied by an operation mounted from a State’s terri-
tory, that State would have no due diligence obligation to put an end to the oper-
ation, absent violation of another primary rule of international law. 
Third, during pre-publication consultations, several States expressed con-
cern as to the burden they would have to shoulder if a cyberspace due diligence 
duty represents a binding, as distinct from hortatory, norm. This concern was 
misguided because the obligation is one of conduct, not of result. The sole re-
quirement is that a State take those measures that are feasible in the attendant 
circumstances.71 There are two key factors in this regard: the technical where-
withal of the territorial State to put an end to the offending operations, and the 
sheer number of offending operations with which some States must deal. Of 
course, because it is subjective and contextual, the feasibility standard contrib-
utes to the grey zone. 
Fourth, there is a lack of certainty with respect to whether the due diligence 
obligation applies only to the States from which the offending cyber operations 
 
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.”) (emphasis added). 
 67. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 36-37 (Rule 6) cmt. 25. 
 68. Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines botnet as: “A network of compromised computers, so-called 
‘bots’, remotely controlled by an intruder, ‘the botherder’, used to conduct coordinated cyber operations, 
such as ‘distributed denial of service’ operations. There is no practical limit on the number of bots that 
can be assimilated into a botnet.” Id. at 563. 
 69. Id. at 38-39 (Rule 6) cmts. 29-31. 
 70. Id. cmt. 30. 
 71. Id. at 43 (Rule 7). 
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are mounted, or whether it also imposes obligations on those through which they 
transit. In the first edition of the Tallinn Manual, the experts did not achieve 
consensus on the issue, primarily because of the technical difficulty of identify-
ing and terminating the operations.72 The experts responsible for the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0, having received advice from technical experts that it is sometimes 
possible for transit States to identify and block harmful cyber operations, con-
cluded that “as a strict matter of law, the ‘transit State’ shoulders the due dili-
gence obligation and must act pursuant to Rule 7 when it (1) possesses 
knowledge (on actual and constructive knowledge . . . .) of an offending opera-
tion that reaches the requisite threshold of harm and (2) can take feasible 
measures to effectively terminate it.”73 The group’s hesitancy in adopting a 
transit State obligation signals that the issue of such an obligation, and its appli-
cation in particular circumstances is likely to remain controversial. 
Finally, the experts agreed that the due diligence obligation attaches when 
cyber operations are being conducted or are imminent and have serious adverse 
consequences for another State. However, as applied in international environ-
mental law, the principal is sometimes treated as having a preventative element.74 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts concluded that there is no preventive duty with 
respect to cyber operations that would require a State to, for instance, monitor 
ongoing cyber operations from its territory or take measures to ensure the cyber 
hygiene of cyber infrastructure that a State or non-State actor might take control 
of to mount the operations.75 They did acknowledge a contrary view,76 the exist-
ence of which raises grey zone considerations. 
E. The Use of Force and Self-Defense 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides: “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This fundamental rule of 
international law is universally recognized as customary in nature,77 and wide-
spread consensus exists that it applies fully to cyber operations conducted by or 
attributable to States.78 There is, however, significant uncertainty as to where the 
use of force threshold lies. 
 
 72. TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 14, at 28-29 (Rule 5) cmt. 12. 
 73. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 33 (Rule 6) cmt. 13. 
 74. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, with commentaries, art. 3, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 372 (2001).  
 75. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 41-42 (Rule 6) cmt. 42; id. at 44-45 (Rule 7) cmts. 
7-10.  The experts looked to the Bosnian Genocide case in drawing this conclusion: “A State’s obligation 
to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of . . . the existence 
of a serious risk that the act [of genocide] will be committed.”  Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 183, ¶ 
431. 
 76. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 46 (Rule 7) cmts. 12-13; see also Corfu Channel, 
1949 I.C.J. at 44 (opinion of Alvarez, J.). 
 77. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 99-101, ¶¶ 188-90. 
 78. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 329 (Rule 68). 
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It appears to be settled that a cyber operation causing physical damage or 
injury qualifies as an unlawful use of force except when otherwise authorized in 
international law, such as in the case of self-defense; authorization,79 mandate or 
authorization by the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter;80 or the affected State’s consent.81 The first edition Tallinn 
Manual experts concluded that certain operations not generating such conse-
quences may also cross the use of force threshold.82 They based their conclusion 
on the International Court of Justice’s determination in the Nicaragua case, 
which held that arming and training guerrilla forces to fight against another State 
amounts to a use of force against that State.83 Applying this finding by analogy, 
they agreed that providing malware and the training necessary to employ it 
against another State is a use of force.84 When the relevant text of the first manual 
was reviewed for inclusion in Tallinn Manual 2.0, no subsequent State practice 
or opinio juris suggested a need for revision.85 
Agreement on a bright line test for qualification of non-destructive or inju-
rious cyber operations as a use of force proved elusive. This being so, the experts 
proposed an approach that assesses the likelihood of States characterizing a cyber 
operation as such. It is based “on the premise that in the absence of a conclusive 
definitional threshold, States contemplating cyber operations, or that are the tar-
get thereof, must be highly sensitive to the international community’s probable 
assessment of whether the operations violate the prohibition of the use of 
force.”86 
The method highlights factors that States are likely to focus on when mak-
ing use of force determinations. Key ones include: severity of consequences; im-
mediacy of consequences; directness of consequences; invasiveness of the oper-
ation; measurability of consequences; military character of the operation; extent 
of State involvement; and any presumptive legality on the type of operation, as 
in the case of psychological operations or espionage.87 Other factors that the ex-
perts identified as relevant include: “the prevailing political environment, 
whether the cyber operation portends the future use of military force, the identity 
of the examiner, any record of cyber operations by the attacker, and the nature of 
the target.”88 With the exception of severity, no single factor alone is likely to 
qualify a cyber operation as a use of force. Instead, these and other factors are 
considered together when assessing the likelihood that the operation in question 
will qualify as a use of force. 
 
 79. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 80. Id., ch. VII. 
 81. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, annex, art. 20 (“Valid consent by a State 
to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the 
former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”). 
 82. TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 14, at 45 (Rule 11) cmts. 4, 8. 
 83. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 118-19, ¶ 228. 
 84. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra 7, at 331-32 (Rule 69) cmt. 4. 
 85. Id. at 331-33 (Rule 69) cmts. 4, 8. 
 86. Id. at 333 (Rule 69) cmt. 8.  This approach was initially proposed by the author in Computer 
Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (1999). 
 87. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 333-36 (Rule 69) cmt. 9. 
 88. Id. at 337 (Rule 69) cmt. 10. 
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The failure to achieve consensus on the use of force threshold, as well as 
the resulting decision of the experts to merely proffer an approach that considers 
a non-exclusive and contextual list of factors, indicates the extent to which the 
law surrounding the prohibition on the use of force constitutes a fertile grey zone 
for States. Somewhat less grey, albeit nevertheless unsettled, is the related matter 
of self-defense. Pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, “Nothing in the pre-
sent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.” As with the prohibition on the use of force, there appears to 
be broad consensus that the article reflects customary international law89 and ap-
plies to defense against cyber armed attacks.90 
The key to understanding the right of self-defense in the cyber context is 
the meaning of the term “armed attack,” which is undefined in international law. 
The prevailing view is that, while all armed attacks are necessarily uses of force, 
not all uses of force qualify as armed attacks. This was the International Court of 
Justice’s approach in Nicaragua, where it distinguished “the most grave forms of 
the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave 
forms.”91 It must be cautioned that the United States continues to maintain that 
there is no difference between the use of force and armed attack thresholds. This 
contention, which is not widely accepted, contributes to the grey zone regarding 
self-defense.92 
For other States, the challenge lies in identifying those cyber uses of force 
that are “most grave.” Self-evidently, “a cyber operation that seriously injures or 
kills a number of persons or that causes significant damage to or destruction of 
property would satisfy the scale and effects requirement.”93 Below this threshold, 
consensus quickly fades. Indeed, the first edition Tallinn Manual experts were 
divided over whether the 2010 Stuxnet operation, which damaged Iranian centri-
fuges, qualified as an armed attack, although they agreed that the operation rose 
 
 89. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 102-03, ¶ 193; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Nuclear Weapons), Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), Judg-
ment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 51, 74, 76 (Nov. 6); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9). 
 90. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 339 (Rule 71). This conclusion is based on the In-
ternational Court of Justice’s determination that Article 51 applies to “any use of force, regardless of the 
weapon used.” Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 244, ¶ 39; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 
(2012), http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Koh-Speech-to-Publish1.pdf; Brian 
Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law and Stability on Cyberspace, Remarks at 
Berkeley Law School (Nov. 10, 2016).  
 91. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 101, ¶ 191. 
 92. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1017, 
¶ 16.3.3.1 (Dec. 2016); see also Koh, supra note 90, at 4; William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil 
Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 299-302 (2004); Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law: 
Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93-96 (1989). All three authors served 
as Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State. 
 93. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 341 (Rule 71) cmt. 8. 
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to the level of a use of force.94 Some experts contended that a cyber operation 
must cause physical damage or injury in order to rise to the level of an armed 
attack. Others, correctly so, were less concerned with the nature of the conse-
quences and focused instead on their severity.95 For instance, States are arguably 
likely to consider a devastating attack on their economic system as an armed 
attack, because they will not countenance being limited to responses that lie be-
low the use of force level permissible only in self-defense.96 
Further complicating matters are situations involving a series of cyber op-
erations, none of which alone crosses the armed attack threshold. There, the rel-
evant question would be whether a State may aggregate the consequences of in-
dividual operations such that they cumulatively reach the armed attack threshold, 
a particularly relevant question if the severity approach just mentioned is 
adopted. In the view of the experts, aggregation is appropriate when a single 
State or group is the author of all the operations. The experts would also allow 
for aggregation when multiple States or groups act in concert.97 However, be-
cause international law does not address this issue and there is little State practice 
or opinio juris to date, their conclusion is speculative. 
An additional topic contributing to the self-defense grey zone is whether 
non-State actors may, as a matter of law, conduct an armed attack in situations 
where their cyber operations cannot be attributed to a State. In the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks, the international community appeared to treat Al Qaeda’s oper-
ations as an armed attack, activating the right of self and collective defense.98 
Doing so was consistent with the text of Article 51, which makes no reference to 
States specifically as the initiators of the requisite armed attack. Because the is-
sue surrounds the actor rather than the cyber character of the operations, some 
States,99 academics,100 and the majority of the Tallinn Manual experts101 have 
agreed that the same logic applies to cyber operations mounted by non-State 
groups. 
 
 94. Id. at 342 (Rule 71) cmt. 10. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberat-
tacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/mid-
dleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html (discussing Stuxnet in greater detail). 
 95. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 342-43 (Rule 71) cmt. 12. 
 96. See GOV’T OF THE NETH., GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIV/CAVV REPORT ON CYBER 
WARFARE 5 (2012) (adopting the conclusion of the Advisory Council on International Affairs that “if 
there are no actual or potential fatalities, casualties or physical damage,” a cyber operation targeting “es-
sential functions of the state could conceivably be qualified as an ‘armed attack’ . . . if it could or did lead 
to serious disruption of the functioning of the state or serious and long-lasting consequences for the sta-
bility of the state.” ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS AND THE ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB. 
INT’L LAW, CYBER WARFARE at 21 (Dec. 2011); See also Koh, supra note 90, at 4; GOV’T OF THE U.K., 
RESPONSE TO HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE’S SIXTH REPORT OF SESSION 2012-13, at 7-8, 
¶ 10 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
 97. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 342 (Rule 71) cmt. 11. 
 98. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); Press Release, 
N. Atl. Treaty Org., Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept.12, 2001); CONSULTATION OF 
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, TERRORIST THREAT TO THE AMERICAS, OAS 
Doc. RC.24/RES.1/01 (2001). 
 99. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 92, at 1018 ¶ 16.3.3.4; GOV’T 
OF THE NETHERLANDS RESPONSE, supra note 96, at 5. 
 100. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS & THE ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB. INT’L 
LAW, CYBER WARFARE at 21-22 (Dec. 2011). 
 101. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 7, at 345 (Rule 71) cmt. 18. 
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However, the International Court of Justice questioned this approach in its 
Armed Activities judgment and Wall advisory opinion.102 In those cases, the 
court appeared unwilling to extend the right of self-defense to situations in which 
the operations of the non-State groups could not be attributed to a State. The 
court has been fairly criticized, including by members of the court itself, for its 
hesitancy to interpret the right as encompassing attacks by non-State actors, es-
pecially in light of the State practice and opinio juris to that effect.103 Yet, its 
pronouncements lend an air of uncertainty to the assertion of a right of self-de-
fense against non-State actors who conduct cyber operations at the armed attack 
level. 
F. Attacks in International Humanitarian Law 
In the field of international humanitarian law (IHL), two issues have 
loomed large. Both concern the protection to which civilians and civilian objects 
are entitled during an international or non-international armed conflict. 
The first issue is the meaning of the term “attack.” Many IHL prohibitions 
are articulated by reference to the term. Key among these are the prohibitions on 
attacking civilians or civilian objects; the ban on indiscriminate attacks;104 the 
rule of proportionality in conducting attacks;105 and the requirement to take pre-
cautions in attack.106 Whether these and other prohibitions and limitations apply 
to cyber operations depends on their qualification as attacks. 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines attacks as 
“acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”107 
Based on this definition, any cyber operation causing damage to objects or injury 
to individuals qualifies as an attack to which the IHL prohibitions and limitations 
apply. The definition seemingly would exclude, however, many cyber opera-
tions, such as the purported Russian attacks against Ukrainian power grids.108 
But this would run counter to the object and purpose of international humanitar-
ian law in the sense that it is under-inclusive. In particular, it would appear in-
congruent to suggest that a kinetic attack causing physical damage to cyber in-
frastructure qualifies as an attack, but a cyber operation that renders the same 
infrastructure inoperative does not. In both cases, the effect is essentially the 
same: the user of the cyber infrastructure is deprived of its benefits. 
 
 102. Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 194, ¶ 139; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 146-47 (Dec. 19). 
 103. See, e.g., Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 215, ¶ 33 (opinion of Higgins, J.); id. at 229-30, ¶ 35 (opinion 
of Kooijmans, J.); id. at 242-43, ¶ 6 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.); Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. at 337, 
¶ 11 (opinion of Simma, J.). 
 104. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 51(2), 51(4), 52(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3, 26-27 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 25, 37 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-
Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW]. 
 105. Additional Protocol I, supra note 104, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. 
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Accordingly, a majority of the first edition Tallinn Manual experts took the 
view that interfering with the functionality of an object would constitute the dam-
age necessary to make the cyber operation an attack to which the rules on attacks 
would apply.109 However, views differed among the experts as to the requisite 
interference with functionality. Some took the position that to qualify, the cyber 
operation would have to necessitate physical replacement of the cyber infrastruc-
ture’s components.110 Others viewed sufficient interference of functionality as 
occurring when there is a need to reinstall an operating system or other data es-
sential to the functioning of the cyber infrastructure.111 Regardless of the ap-
proach adopted vis-à-vis functionality, many questions remain. For instance, is 
there a temporal dimension to the loss of functionality, such that a temporary 
denial of service operation does not qualify unless it results in physical damage 
or injury? 
In this regard, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
suggested that “an operation designed to disable an object—for example a com-
puter or a computer network—constitutes an attack under the rules on the con-
duct of hostilities, whether or not the object is disabled through kinetic or cyber 
means.” 112 It has also noted that “in order to differentiate between operations 
that amount to attacks and those that do not, it has been suggested that the crite-
rion of ‘inconvenience’ should be relied upon.”113 But the ICRC has also cau-
tioned, “what is covered by ‘inconvenience’ is not defined and this terminology 
is not used in IHL.”114 Thus, a significant grey area endures with respect to cyber 
attacks. Because attacks are the defining activity of armed conflict, and there is 
extraordinary reliance in modern societies on cyber activities, this grey zone rep-
resents an especially problematic conundrum. 
Uncertainty likewise surrounds cyber operations directed at data. It is well 
accepted that when the destruction or alteration of data results in injury or dam-
age, the cyber operation in question is subject to the full gamut of attack rules. 
However, the question is whether the data per se benefits from the protection that 
civilian objects enjoy. This depends on whether data is an object as a matter of 
law. 
The first edition Tallinn Manual experts struggled with the issue,115 and it 
has been the subject of an active debate among IHL experts.116 On the one hand, 
treating data as a civilian object would prove over-inclusive because doing so 
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would bar some cyber operations that are well accepted in State practice, partic-
ularly psychological operations directed at the enemy civilian population. On the 
other hand, failure to treat data as an object falls short in the sense that doing so 
would open the door to cyber operations that could dramatically affect the civil-
ian population, as in the case of a cyber attack against a State’s electronic ar-
chives or its pension system. 
A majority of the experts were of the view, drawing on the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties,117 that the “ordinary meaning” of the term “ob-
ject” could not be interpreted as necessarily including data, nor was there suffi-
cient subsequent State practice or opinio juris to support its extension to data in 
either treaty law or as an interpretation of the equivalent customary law prohibi-
tion.118 Their uneasiness over this conclusion was signaled by the unusual inclu-
sion of the caveat that this is the case “in the current state of the law.”119 As with 
the ambiguity surrounding the term “attack,” doubt regarding the legal character 
of data under IHL cuts at the heart of cyber operations during armed conflict 
because many such operations are designed to destroy, damage, or alter data. 
III. THE WAY AHEAD 
States have not been idle in the face of uncertainty as to the application of 
international law to cyberspace. Early suggestions by some States that interna-
tional law does not apply to this new domain of international relations have since 
been widely rejected. Indeed, States have been working together over the past 
few years to identify norms of cyber behavior. Most notable in this regard is the 
work of the GGE, which initially consisted of representatives from fifteen States, 
including China, Russia, and the United States. In 2013, it published a consensus 
report confirming, “International law, and in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and pro-
moting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible [information and communica-
tions technologies (ICT)] environment.”120 The group agreed that “State sover-
eignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply 
to State conduct of ICT-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT in-
frastructure within their territory.” Furthermore, the group affirmed that human 
rights law applies to cyber activities, and, addressing the issue of attribution, that 
“States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts.”121 
In 2015 the GGE, which had grown to include representatives of twenty 
States, reaffirmed the points it had made two years earlier and added specific 
references to the principles of sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of disputes, 
non-intervention, and due diligence, although with respect to due diligence, the 
reference was framed in hortatory, rather than obligatory, terms. It also cited the 
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core principles of international humanitarian law and emphasized the prohibition 
on the threat or use of force. 122 
While these efforts largely settled the issue of international law’s applica-
bility to cyberspace and confirmed the relevance of its core principles and rules, 
they did not achieve the granularity necessary to shrink grey zones. Nor is estab-
lishing such granularity likely to occur given the typically slow pace of progress 
in multinational fora dealing with international law. Accordingly, it will likely 
be left to States to address grey zones through State practice and expressions of 
opinio juris. However, because most State practice in cyberspace is classified, 
the bulk of the heavy lifting will likely have to be accomplished by opinio juris. 
This may occur in the abstract, with States making general statements on legal 
issues that occupy the grey zones. Additional expressions of opinio juris could 
come through a State’s justification of their cyber activities based on interna-
tional law or a State’s condemnation of other States’ actions based on legal 
grounds. 
Such statements may clarify the grey zone issues in two ways. First, when 
sufficient State practice and opinio juris exist to constitute “a general practice 
accepted as law,” a new norm of customary international law crystallizes.123 Yet, 
because the threshold for crystallization is high, it is more likely that grey zones 
will be narrowed through State expressions of opinio juris that clarify uncertain-
ties or disagreements over the extant law. In this regard, opinio juris serves an 
interpretive function, rather than a law-creating one. Such expressions can also 
contribute to the interpretation of ambiguous treaty provisions, such as the mean-
ing of the terms “use of force” and “armed attack” in Articles 2(4) and 51, re-
spectively, of the U.N. Charter.124 
This begs the question of whether the grey zones should be clarified. The 
argument is sometimes heard that States value ambiguity, as it affords them 
greater freedom of action in cyberspace. For instance, uncertainty over the nature 
of cyber operations that violate sovereignty not only lessens the likelihood that 
one’s own remote operations will be styled as unlawful, but also lessens the risk 
that a target State will take countermeasures pursuant to the law of State respon-
sibility. Similarly, ambiguity as to where the use of force threshold lies reduces 
the risk that a State’s non-destructive or injurious cyber operations will be char-
acterized as a violation of the use of force prohibition. 
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While this may be so, the principle of sovereign equality125 means that a 
State seeking to exploit ambiguity may later find itself the victim of that very 
ambiguity. Indeed, opportunity is equally a risk in international law. Moreover, 
uncertainty can lead to escalation. Consider the case of a State that conducts a 
cyber operation in the belief that the operation does not amount to an internation-
ally wrongful act. The target State responds with a countermeasure based on its 
assessment that the first operation constituted an internationally wrongful act. 
Because the first State believed it had acted lawfully, it might now interpret the 
countermeasure as escalatory. The same dynamic could operate, for instance, 
with respect to the meaning of the term armed attack in the law of self-defense. 
Grey zones constitute fertile ground for an escalatory spiral. 
Clarification of grey zone issues will also enhance deterrence in cyber-
space.126 International law provides for set categories of responses to specified 
types of actions. Unfriendly but lawful cyber activities may be responded to by 
acts of retorsion.127 Internationally wrongful cyber operations, on the other hand, 
may permit “injured” States to take cyber or non-cyber countermeasures.128 
Cyber operations amounting to an armed attack may be responded to with cyber 
or kinetic uses of force. Certitude that a cyber operation can risk consequences 
at a set level can deter the taking of that operation, because the State concerned 
cannot act in the hope that the target State will hesitate to respond out of concern 
that its response might be viewed as unlawful. 
Ultimately, legal clarity breeds international stability. The brighter the red-
lines of international law as applied to cyber activities, the less opportunity States 
will have to exploit grey zones in ways that create instability. Although the in-
ternational community is working together commendably to identify applicable 
norms for cyberspace, it will likely fall to States to imbue the law with sufficient 
specificity to effectively deprive those who would abuse grey zones for malevo-
lent and destabilizing ends. It remains to be seen whether States will display the 
willpower to take on this important task. 
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